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This paper identies the necessary and su¢ cient condition for the transitivity of the majority rule when individuals
are never indi¤erent between two distinct alternatives (linear domain). By introducing the concept of the relevant
population for each set of alternatives, a unique condition can be stated, and substitute the variety of conditions
that already exist in the literature.
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1 Introduction
The (simple) majority rule does not consistently yield transitive social preferences (Condorcet paradox). This
fact led economic theory to work in identifying the set of cases in which (simple) majority rule works ne. Many
important results have been stated so far. Apart from the popular su¢ ciency conditions, such as single-peaked
(Black, 1948) and value-restricted preferences (Sen, 1966), sets of necessary conditions for the well-behaving of the
(simple) majority rule have been o¤ered (Inada, 1969 and Sen, 1969).
This paper identies a unique condition, that is both necessary and su¢ cient for the transitivity of the (simple)
majority rule in the linear domain (all preference proles of linear orders) in an economically meaningful manner.
2 Analysis
Suppose that there exists a set of individuals N = f1; 2; :::; ng; #N  3 and odd. Each i 2 N has complete,
transitive and strict (linear) preferences on a nite set of alternatives X, #X  3; which can be represented by the
linear order Pi on X. That is, the only real restriction that we impose on individual preferences is the fact that no
indi¤erences between any two alternatives are allowed. Other than that, any linear order on X is permitted.
Assume that the Social Welfare Function (SWF)1 of (simple) majority is applied to aggregate social preferences.
Dene the SWF of (simple) majority as follows:
xPmy if and only if #fi 2 N jxPiyg > #fi 2 N jyPixg
We dene as X the preference prole of the society N on a set of alternatives X and ztX the number of
individuals that have the same t   type preferences on X (the preferences of these individuals are represented by
the same linear order).
Given the environment that is described above, dene the following.
Denition 1 Individuals i and j are mutually exclusive in X if and only if for every two distinct x and y from X
either xPiy and yPjx or yPix and xPjy:
Denition 2 Given a set of alternatives X, a relevant population ~NX is a subset of N that a) does not include any
mutually exclusive individuals in X and b) Nn ~NX is either the union of #Nn ~NX2 disjoint pairs of mutually exclusive
individuals or empty.
Since Nn ~NX contains individuals that, in pairs, cancel out each other votes, it easily follows that if #fi 2
N jxPiyg > #fi 2 N jyPixg then #fi 2 ~NX jxPiyg > #fi 2 ~NX jyPixg and vice versa for any ~NX . This allows us to
re-phrase the denition of the (simple) majority rule in the following way:
xPmy if and only if #fi 2 ~NX jxPiyg > #fi 2 ~NX jyPixg for any ~NX
Denition 3 The relevant preference prole of X, ~X , is the preference prole of any relevant population ~NX (it
is trivial to see that the preference proles of all relevant populations are equal).
Denition 4 A preference prole X is balanced if and only if each x 2 X is the best or the worst choice for less
than half of the population.
We can now state the theorem.
Theorem 1 The (simple) majority rule yields transitive social preferences in the linear domain if and only if for
every triplet A = fx; y; zg  X, the relevant preference prole of A is not balanced.
Proof. If for every triple A = fx; y; zg  X, ~A is not balanced we have that for any ~NA, # ~NA > 0 (since #N is
odd we must have non-empty relevant populations) and x 2 A is the best or the worst choice for more than half
of any ~NA. Following the denition of a relevant population we understand that the types of preferences in ~A is
3 (at most). If they are 1 or 2, (simple) majority yields transitive preferences (the Condorcet paradox requires at
1Arrow, 1951
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least three types of preferences). If ~A contains 3 types of preferences, and x 2 A is the best choice for more than
half of any ~NA we have that xPsmy; xPsmz (which is enough to guarantee transitivity in the present environment).
Obviously, if x 2 A is the worst choice for more than half of any ~NA, some y 2 A will be the best for more than half
of any ~NA leading, by the above, to transitive social preferences. Now, we have to prove that if (simple) majority
yields transitive social preferences, then for every triple A = fx; y; zg  X, ~A must not be balanced. To do that we
shall assume that there exists A = fx; y; zg  X, such that ~A is balanced and (simple) majority yields transitive
social preferences. It must be the case that the types of preferences in ~A is exactly 3 (in all other cases there exists
x 2 A that is best or worst for more than # ~NA2 individuals for any ~NA). That is, in each level of preferences (best,
intermediate, worst) all elements of A appear in exactly one type (we have "Codorcet paradox" style preferences).
Since all z1A ; z
2
A
; z3A <
#NA
2 ; for any
~NA, we get that z1A + z
2
A
> z3A ; z
2
A
+ z3A > z
1
A
; z1A + z
3
A
> z2A , or in
other words, cyclical social preferences and no transitivity. This concludes the proof.
3 Concluding remarks
Recent literature on majority decisions has been, mainly, focused in providing characterizations of the majority
rule (e.g. Campbell and Kelly, 2000) and in identifying its "good" properties (Dasgupta and Maskin, 1998). The
present paper, reviews the issue of transitivity of the majority rule and establishes a unique necessary and su¢ cient
condition. By introducing the concept of the relevant population for every set of alternatives, we can now easily
approach the problem, from an economically meaningful way.
The idea for the result is simple, and based on construction or elimination of Condorcet cycles. As far as triplets
of alternatives (x; y; z) are concerned, the above condition states that one of the three alternatives in (x; y; z)
is either strictly preferred to the other two, or strictly worse than the other two, for a majority of voters, after
eliminating any pair of voters that have exactly o¤setting preference orderings. It is easy to see that, if the identied
condition holds for any triplet (x; y; z), majority voting implies transitivity almost by construction, because there is
an alternative that is worst or best in any pairwise comparison with the two other alternatives. Therefore, it must
be that pairwise majority voting generates transitive preferences.
For the counterpart, one can show that if there exists such a triplet for which none of the alternatives is ranked
rst or last by a majority of voters of the relevant population, then this triplet can be used to construct a Condorcet
cycle. This argument follows from the observation that after eliminating o¤-setting (mutually exclusive) voters from
considerations, at most three di¤erent proles remain. If there are only one or two proles, transitivity is guaranteed,
so lack of transitivity requires three proles, and they must form a Condorcet cycle. The result is then immediate.
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